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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal and state constraints on the transferability of water con-
trolled by Bureau of Reclamation projects and state conservancy
districts insulate this water from market pressure from both muni-
cipalities and industry. This market insulation would appear to
have the two-fold effect of maintaining water for farming interests
(those able to purchase water in what is referred to as the "project
market") at an artificially low price, while keeping the price for
industry and municipal interests (those forced to purchase in what
is referred to as the "native market") artificially high. The dis-
parity in the price of water between the "project markets" and "na-
tive markets" is aggravated by the fact that the price of water in
the native market is often artificially high because of transaction
costs incurred as a prerequisite to the transfer of the native water
rights.
Farming interests have considerable legal authority for main-
taining project water exclusively for irrigation purposes and ex-
amples at both the federal and state level demonstrate this. Absent
congressional action, project water will remain insulated from the
native market. When the federal protections are finally lifted and
these two markets are merged, the market price for irrigation water
rights may increase dramatically, making farming suddenly unfeas-
ible in numerous areas because of a lack of self-imposed conserva-
tion measures. Although no immnediate solution at the federal level
is apparent, this article will offer a model for reducing the dispar-
ity between the two markets by eliminating some of the confusion
surrounding the transfer process when "native" water rights are
involved.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT MARKET
At the turn of the century, from a line east of the Rocky Moun-
tains to the Pacific Ocean and from the Canadian border to the
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boundary of Mexico-an area greater than that of the original thir-
teen states-there existed "a desert, impossible of agricultural use
without artificial irrigation."' Those who fought to turn this desert
into irrigable farm land
found the State's rivers and streams in their natural state to pre-
sent the familiar paradox of feast or famine. With melting snow
in the high mountains in the spring, small streams became roaring
freshets, and the rivers they fed carried the potential for destruc-
tive floods. But with the end of the rainy season in the early
spring, farmers depended entirely upon water from such streams
and rivers until the rainy season again began in the fall. Long be-
fore that time, however, rivers which ran bank full in the spring
had been reduced to a bare trickle of water.2
Western farmers did not have the resources to finance construc-
tion of the reservoir and irrigation works needed to harness these
wild watercourses. Demands were made for a partnership between
the irrigation farmers and the federal government and it was pro-
posed that loans should be made by the federal government to the
local irrigators. These federal loans were to be secured by the ir-
rigation works, the waters of the area, and the property of the
farmers. Federal and state legislative enactments were necessary
to cement this partnership-a federal law establishing the loan pro-
gram to finance the reclamation of the arid lands and a state law
establishing a Vehicle for receiving the proceeds of the loan. Fed-
eral and state laws soon emerged. First came the federal Reclama-
tion Act of 1902,s and by the late 1920's state conservancy and irriga-
tion district laws were being enacted. 4
1. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142, 156 (1935).
2. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 722 (1973).
3. The Federal Bureau of Reclamation was the political solution at the
federal level For an excellent summary of the federal reclamation
laws from their inception, Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat.
388 (codified at scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. ch. 12 (1970)), to date,
see Sax, The Federal Reclamation Law, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
111 (R. Clark ed. 1967). See also E. WARNE, THE BUREAU OF REC-
LAMATION (1973).
The following materials contain information related to the subject
of this article: COMMITTEE ON WATER OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WATER AND CHOICE IN THE
COLORADO BASIN (1968); L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, WATER TRANS-
FERS (1970); J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN & J. M4ILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY
(1969); Anderson, Windfall Gains From Transfer of Water Allotments
Within the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, 43 LAND ECON. 265(1967); Castle & Stoevener, Water Resources Allocation, Extramarket
Values, and Market Criteria: A Suggested Approach, 10 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 532 (1970); Dewsnup, Assembling Water Rights for a New
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III. FEDERAL CONDITIONS LIMITING THE
TRANSFERABILITY OF WATER IN RECLAMATION PROJECTS
Carved and wedged into the language of any law creating a fed-
eral program are the provisions that insure achievement of the fed-
eral purpose. Those who borrow from the federal agency are bound
by the contours of its authorizing legislation. The Reclamation Act
of 19025 presents a classic example.
The Reclamation Act had from its inception the primary goal
of promoting irrigation farming.6 Those who wish to transfer or
Use: Needed Reforms in the Law, 17 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST.
613 (1972); Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resource Policy, 28
Am. J. EcoN. & Soc. 131 (1969); McHugh, Allocation of Water from
Federal Reclamation Projects: Can the States Decide?, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q.
343 (1974); Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study
in Federal Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 13 (1965); Trelease,
Changes and Transfers of Water Rights, 13 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L.
INST. 507 (1967); Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights,
Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1965);
Trelease, Transfer of Water Rights-Errata and Addenda-Sales For
Recreational Purposes and to Districts, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 321(1967); Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case Studies in the
Transfer of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1 (1966).
4. In projects prior to 1926 the Bureau would obtain water rights from
a state and then enter into a water delivery and repayment contract
with an individual farmer. After 1926, the Bureau contracted with
some form of public district called an irrigation or conservancy dis-
trict. For a good general description of this contracting process, see
C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: To-
WARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES (National Water
Commission 1971); NATIONAL WATER CoMIIssION, WATER POLICIES FOR
THE FUTURE 264-70 (1973); Sax, supra note 3, at 136-71.
5. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at scattered
sections of 43 U.S.C. ch. 12 (1970)).
6. For an excellent discussion of the history of the Reclamation Act and
the importance of the development of small irrigation farms, see
United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1118 (1976) and
Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 292 (1958). Both Sax
and Warne note that the Bureau's function as a water provider pres-
ently goes far beyond the irrigation of small farms:
Because of the large quantities of irrigation water neces-
sary to produce a crop, the basic purpose of reclamation still
overshadows all other uses of reclamation project water. In
1969, approximately 27.4 million acre-feet of water were pro-
vided by reclamation project facilities: 25.4 million acre-feet
for irrigation, 1.8 million acre-feet for municipal and indus-
trial purposes, and 149,000 acre-feet for other non-agricultural
purposes.
The importance of other services introduced as incidentals
to the original purpose of reclamation is shown by the facts
that in 1969 project power plants sold 45.6 billion kilowatt-
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sell their reclamation water rights to a buyer who intends to put
the water to domestic or industrial use may be barred entirely by
the claim that these uses are contrary to the purposes of the Re-
clamation Act. While many new projects are intended to meet
municipal and industrial demands as well as irrigation,7 absent
specific statutory language, irrigation must be viewed as the use
most consistent with the legislative history of the Reclamation Act.8
The requirement that water cannot be used to irrigate a farm ex-
ceeding 160 acres0 is another, more specific, condition on the use
of project water. There are still other federal conditions: the "ap-
hours of electrical energy for $157.3 million, that an estimated
$27.7 million in flood damages were prevented by project
dams, and that the project reservoirs provided 54.5 million
visitor-days of recreation.
E. WARNE, supra note 3, at 53-54. See Sax, supra note 3, at 121.
7. For a good discussion of the project planning process and statutory
modifications for specific projects, see Sax, supra note 3, at 147-57,
215-17.
8. Pring & Edelman, Reclamation Law Constraints on Energy/Industrial
Uses of Western Water, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 297 (1975) (outlining
the argument that absent a specific statutory exception, reclamation
project water must be used for irrigation).
9. See § III-B of text infra. The original provision is Act of June 17,
1902, ch. 1093, § 5, 32 Stat. 389 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970)).
Good general discussion of the problems of landownership in rec-
lamation law is contained in two government publications: BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, ACREAGE LIMITATION POLICY (U.S. Gov't Printing Of-
fice 1946), and the DEPT. OF INTERIOR, LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY ON FED-
ERAL RECLAMATION PROJECTS (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1946).
See E. GRAHAM, SOME ASPECTS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN
CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 146 (1961). See also R.
DE ROOS, THE THIRSTY LAND (1948); DOWNEY, THEY WOULD RULE THE
VALLEY (1947); Fuller, Acreage Limitation in Federal Irrigation Proj-
ects With Particular Reference to the Central Valley Project of Cal-
ifornia, 31 J. FARM ECON. 976 (1949); Graham, The Central Valley
Project: Resource Development of a Natural Basin, 38 CALIF. L. REV.
588 (1950); Maass, Administering the CVP, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 666
(1950); Taylor, Central Valley Project: Water and Land, 2 WEST. POL.
Q. 229 (1949); Taylor, Destruction of Federal Reclamation Policy? The
Ivanhoe Case, 10 STAN. L. REV. 76 (1957); Taylor, Excess Land
Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 978 (1964); Taylor,
Excess Land Law: Secretary's Decision? A Study in Administration
of Federal-State Relations, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1962); Taylor, Ex-
cess Land Law on the Kern?, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 153 (1958); Taylor, The
Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J. 477
(1955); Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Legislative Erosion of Public
Policy, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 480 (1958); Taylor, The Excess Land
Law: Pressure vs. Principle, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 499 (1959); Taylor,
The 160-Acre Water Limitation and the Water Resources Commission,
3 WEST. POL. Q. 435 (1950); Trelease, Government Ownership and
Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638 (1957); Comment, The
TWO-TIERED MARKET
purtenance requirement"; 10 the requirement that all water users
must be residents of an irrigation district;" the vague requirement
that water be applied only to beneficial uses;12 and the requirement
that the water not be used in a manner which will deteriorate lands
by "improper use."'3 Finally, the Secretary of the Interior's power
to make general rules and regulations governing the use of water
in the irrigation of lands' 4 within any project raises the specter
of even more federal conditions.' 5
Ivanhoe Decision: The Validity of Contracts Containing the 160 Acre
Limitation, 45 CALIF. L. RV. 763 (1957); Note, Acreage Limitation:
Policy Considerations, 38 CALUF. L. REv. 728 (1950).
10. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 372 (1970)).
11. In referring to the sale of rights to the use of water delivered through
federal reclamation projects to private landowners, the Act provides,
in part, that "no such sale shall be made to any landowner unless
he be an actual bona fide resident on such land, or occupant thereof
residing in the neighborhood of said land." Reclamation Act of 1902,
ch. 1093, § 5, 32 Stat. 389 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970)).
12. Id.
13. Act of August 4, 1939, ch. 418, § 6, 53 Stat. 1191 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 485e (1970)). Requirements have been upheld which limit users
to a certain quantity per irrigated acre as a means of preventing waste.
See In re Bridger Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289 (Wyo.
1965).
14. Act of August 13, 1914, ch. 247, § 6, 38 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 440 (1970)). See also Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 10, 32
Stat. 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1970)).
15. Sax describes the broad powers of the Secretary:
Of course these broad powers could be narrowly construed.
For example, the Secretary could be held to be barred from
enforcing rules that interfered with established uses which
were valid when initiated; such rules could be interpreted as
being enforceable only if they were included in water-right
applications or contracts for service at the time such applica-
tions or contracts were first made. But it is to be expected
that these powers will be viewed as a partial grant to the
Secretary of the general police power over project users, and
thus that the power will not be required to respect existing
uses any more than does the state's police power.
Whatever rights users may have in their existing uses, a
separate question is raised when they seek to initiate a right
to the use of project water. Here again the problem has not
been faced by the courts, although it was raised at least once.
It has been traditional, of course, to view one at this stage
as a mere supplicant-a seeker after a "privilege"-who has
virtually no rights to assert against an unexplained denial,
a grant with odious conditions attached, or an absence of any
procedural safeguards. These old, simplistic views have be-
gun to give way to notions of a "new property" which must
have some protection against such cursory dispositions, though
the bounds are just beginning to be formulated. The devel-
opment of such rights could be nowhere more appropriately
tested than in the context of distribution of great natural re-
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Since Bureau of Reclamation projects arle generally operated
through contracts with a state agency, and under these contracts
consent must be obtained before project water can be sold or leased,
these federally imposed conditions may be enforced by the Secre-
tary of the Interior either as a matter of contract or as mandated
by federal law.
-There are three primary reasons for the great potential for liti-
gation over these federally imposed conditions. First, water is a
scarce resource increasingly demanded by industrial and domestic
users. When the demand for water for non-agricultural uses gets
high enough to economically justify litigation, law suits will be filed
both to break and to enforce these federal conditions. Pressure will
mount to bring about changes through federal legislation. Second,
when a lawsuit is brought, it ideally should be brought against a
single defendant-one against whom a judgment can have far-reach-
ing effects. The Secretary of the Interior is such a defendant. He is
far from "judgment proof" on the issue of water since he controls an
irrigation water supply of over twenty-seven million acre-feet.
Third, the Secretary is governed by vague, poorly compiled, confus-
ing statutes and administrative regulations. 16 Those who have fol-
lowed litigation in the areas of federal welfare, 17 federal housing,' 8
and the National Environmental Policy Act' 9 are well aware that
successful statutory arguments can be made once there is sufficient
commitment to litigate the parameters of a federal bureaucrat's au-
thority.
These vague federal statutes and regulations can be used by
farming interests both as a shield against proposed federal action
which would allow the transfer of water rights out of irrigation,
and as a sword to compel the Secretary of the Interior to enforce ex-
isting legislation which preserves the status quo.
sources harnessed by the expenditure of vast sums of publicfunds.
Sax, supra note 3, at 184-85 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
16. Sax notes that the Congress has not specifically stated to what degree
certain federal enactments supplement or amend the original reclama-
tion law. Nor, has Congress repealed certain older enactments which
no longer have any application. Sax, supra note 3, at 123.
17. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (construing a federal
welfare regulation to invalidate more restrictive state statutes).
18. See Housing Auth. of Omaha v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973) (upholding a feder-
ally imposed model lease and grievance procedure over local, feder-
ally funded housing authority).
19. See generally Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The
Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970). Litigation over the Federal Water Pollu-
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A. The Environmentalists' Use of the Secretary of the Interior's Lack
of Authority as a Shield
On December 10, 1976, a group of environmentalists 20 filed an
action in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia against Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the Interior.21 The com-
plaint alleged that the Secretary had violated the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969,22 and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act.23 The complaint was amended to add an allegation that the
Secretary also exceeded his authority under the reclamation law
establishing an irrigation proj'ect on the Navajo Indian Reserva-
tion.24
The complaint sought an injunction against the continued con-
struction of a twenty-three megawatt power plant on the San Juan
River in northern New Mexico. The plant was designed to provide
the electrical power for the Bureau of Reclamation Navajo Indian
Irrigation Project.25
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II 1972), illustrates
the amount of litigation that can be generated under the assertion
of federal rights. In promulgating the first non-point source standards
under the Act; 40 C.F.R. pt. 125 (1973), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) excepted many significant non-point sources, greatly
reducing the regulations' effectiveness. A federal court invalidated
those regulations. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 396
F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. -1975). As a result, the EPA promulgated a
new set of regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 7963 (1976) (to be codified in
40 C.F.R. § 125.53), which many groups view as inadequate. The
failure of the EPA to establish and enforce effective standards has
since prompted another lawsuit seeking to require the EPA to take
a more active role in efforts to reduce the salinity of the Colorado
River. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, [1977] 8 ENVM. REP.
(BNA) 714 (D.D:C., filed August 22, 1977) (No. 77-1436).
20. The complaint was filed by the National Wildlife Federation and the
New Mexico Wildlife Federation, Trout Unlimited, and the New Mex-
ico Council of Trout Unlimited. The New Mexico State Game Com-
mission and the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish were al-
lowed to intervene.
21. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, [1977] 8 ENViR. REP. (BNA) 348
(D.D.C. June 21, 1977) (No. 76-2266).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666 (1976).
24. Although this is not an example of an irrigator's attempt to preserve
the status quo, since the power plant would have ultimately provided
power to promote irrigation farming on the Navajo Reservation, it,
nevertheless, illustrates the method by which small interests can use
a bureaucrat's lack of authority to great advantage. 43 U.S.C. §§ 615ii
to 615oo (1970).
25. This project was authorized June 13, 1962. 43 U.S.C. § 615ii (1970).
It is part of the Colorado River Storage Project designed to irrigate
110,630 acres owned by the Navajos of northwestern New Mexico.
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Even through 3.6 million dollars had been spent for equipment
and the plant was ten percent complete, the court enjoined further
construction, relying primarily on the fact that the Secretary of
the Interior had exceeded his authority under the reclamation
law.20
In rejecting the arguments of the Secretary, the court limited
the Secretary to doing only those acts spelled out with precision
in the statute: "Clearly the appropriate officials have some discre-
tion to modify aspects of the various programs within the Colorado
River Storage Project. But such modifications must occur within
the statutory authority granted by Congress. '27
When the 'environmentalists' commitment to preserving the
quality of the river below Navajo Dam justified the expense of liti-
gating the Secretary's absence of authority, the suit was brought.
B. The Small Farmers' Use of Existing Reclamation Statutes as a
Sword
As recently as 1971 a report of the National Water Commission
quoted Bureau of Reclamation officials as stating that the residency
and appurtenance requirements of federal law applicable to Bureau
projects were of "minor" importance.28 Economic and political
pressures, however, have a way of resurrecting old and rarely used
laws. 29 As a result of litigation against the Bureau of Reclamation,
both the 160-acre limit and the residency requirement of reclama-
tion law now have the potential of dramatically affecting project
water rights in the West.
The enforcement of the 160-acre limit has and will continue to
cause extensive internal conflict between large and small farmers.
26. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at
348. The court also held that the federal action violated the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.
The court determined that no authority for constructing the plant
existed, even though the report of a Senate Committee studying the
matter specifically stated that the project included a power plant at
Navajo Dam. S. REP. No. 363, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969). The
court also found unpersuasive the fact that a 1966 reevaluation report
available to a house subcommittee also mentioned the power plant.
Proposed Amendments to the Act of June 13, 1962, with respect to the
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project: Hearings on H.R. 13001 Before the
Sub-comm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Comm. on In-
terior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970).
27. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, No. 76-2266, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C.
June 21, 1977) (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
28. C. MEYERS & R. PosNER, supra note 4, at A3-4.
29. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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However, whether a 160-acre farm is economically feasible in 1978
is well beyond the scope of this article. Rather, the 160-acre limita-
tion and the residency requirement will be used to illustrate the
insulated nature of the proj'ect water' market and how these and
other restrictions can be enforced to further that market insulation.
A brief explanation of the 160-acre limitation and the residency
requirement is necessary for a full understanding of the surround-
ing litigation.30 The acreage limitation, or "excess land" provisions
of reclamation law, limit to 160 acres the irrigable land held in
single ownership which can be supplied with project water. If a
husband and wife own irrigable land jointly, water can be supplied
to 320 acres. Although there have beenexemptions and modifica-
tions for certain projects, the limitation of water delivery to 160
acres owned by a single individual has remained unchanged since
the inception of the Reclamation Act in 1902.3
1
All lands served by reclamation projects may be categorized as
either "excess" or "non excess." All irrigable land that is supplied
project water but does not exceed 160 acres beneficially owned by
one individual, or 320 acres jointly owned by a husband and wife,
is categorized as nonexcess. Excess land is all the irrigable land
within the project area which exceeds the 160-acre or 320-acre en-
titlement.32 An excess landowner must designate that portion of
his irrigable land which he wishes to be classified as nonexcess and,
therefore, entitled to receive project water.33
Excess lands are not eligible to receive project water unless they
are sold under a "recordable contract." The recordable contract
must provide for disposition of excess lands to an eligible nonexcess
landowner within a designated time period at a price that is inde-
pendent of the value of the project benefits. The Secretary of the
Interior must approve the selling price. Failure to dispose of excess
30. Since no formal rules have as yet been adopted by the Bureau, this
discussion of Bureau of Reclamation policy with respect to both the
,160-acre limit and the residency requirement is drawn from the mem-
orandum of law distributed by the Bureau of Reclamation in connec-
tion with the proposed hearings on the Department of Interior regula-
tions regarding acreage limitations, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044 (1977) (pro-
posed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. §§ 426.1 to .14). Memorandum, The
Acreage Limitation Provisions of Reclamation Law, Sept. 1977 (un-
published paper on file at University of Nebraska Law Review).
31. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 2. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,046 (1977)
(proposed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4 (b)).
32. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 3. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,046 (1977)(proposed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4 (d)).
33. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 3. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,047 (1977)(proposed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.9 (a) (1)).
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lands within the designated time period will result in the Secretary
of the Interior obtaining a power of attorney to sell the land. If
a recordable contract is entered into, however, project water can
be supplied to the excess land during the disposal process. 3
4
It is not necessary that land be held in individual ownership
to establish eligibility for project water. Permissible land owner-
ships include joint tenancies, corporations, trusts, partnerships, and
tenancies in common.35
The acreage limitation was directed at land ownership and did
not limit the size of a particular farming operation. It was per-
missible for a farm operator to evade the acreage limitation because
the 160-acre limitation did not extend to land supplied with project
water which was leased from other landowners. Many of the large
farms that exist on reclamation projects were, therefore, able to
irrigate in excess of the 160-acre limitation by leasing land.36
The Reclamation Act required that in order to become eligible
for project benefits a landowner had to live on or near the land
he wished to irrigate. This residency requirement remained in ef-
fect until the landowner had been issued a final certificate declaring
his water right. However, once he had received the water right
certificate, the landowner was not required to maintain this resi-
dency; it was said that "the lien created by the water right applica-
tion had been satisfied. 3 7 The Bureau of Reclamation has taken
the position that by virtue of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 192638
(the present basis for the administration of the acreage limitation
provision) the irrigation districts and not the individual landowners
assumed liability for the payments due the federal government.
Since the residency requirement was not contained in the 1926 Act,
the Bureau of Reclamation has not enforced this requirement since
1926.39
34. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 3-4. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,046 (1977)
(proposed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.5 (a)).
35. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 5. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,047 (1977)(proposed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.7 (b) - (e)).
36. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 5. But see 42 Fed. Reg. 43,047 (1977)
(proposed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.8)).
37. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 5-6. See also Reclamation Act of 1902,
ch. 1093, § 5, 32 Stat. 388, 389.
38. Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, ch. 383, 44 Stat. 699 (43 U.S.C.
§ 423e (1970)). The Bureau apparently no longer maintains this view.
For a good discussion of the Bureau's previous contention, see Yellen
v. Hickel, 335 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D. Cal. 1971), vacated and remanded
with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing sub nom. United
States v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 6.
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1. The National Land for People Litigation
In May of 1976, National Land for People, Inc., a non-profit
membership organization composed predominantly of farmers and
farmowners, filed an action seeking to compel the' Bureau of Re-
clamation to fully enforce the Reclamation Act of 1902 by pro-
mulgating rules for provision for sale of excess lands in a manner
consistent with the Act.40 In entering a preliminary injunction re-
quiring the formal adoption of rules, the court in National Land
for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation4' held:
The legislative history of the reclamation laws indicates a pur-
pose of the Federal Government to create small tracts of privately
held farm land available at nonspeculative prices in areas irrigated
by Federal projects....
An important aspect of the sale of excess lands is the determi-
nation of its fair market value by the Bureau without project en-
hancement. A recent publication of the General Accounting Office
concludes that the Bureau's appraisal techniques should be im-
proved and that written guidelines are needed setting forth the
criteria and procedures used in evaluating the reasonableness of the
sales price of those lands. 42
2. The Yellen Litigation
In a related case, Yellen v. Hickel,4 3 filed much earlier, the Sec-
retary of the Interior was sued by farmers seeking a writ of man-
damus to force him to comply with the residency provisions of the
federal reclamation law. The United States District Court for the
District of California held that all projects constructed pursuant
to the Reclamation Act of 1902 were subject to the residency re-
quirement. It rejected the Bureau's contention that all projects
since 1926 were exempt.44 The court also noted that completion
of payments to the Bureau of Reclamation for construction of the
project works would not relieve the obligation to comply with the
residency requirement.4" The action was appealed.
40. National Land For People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp.
449 (D.D.C. 1976).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 452 (citations omitted).
43. 335 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Cal. 1971), vacated and remanded with instruc-
tions to dismiss for lack of standing sub nom. United States v. Imperial
Irr. Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Bowker v. Morton,
541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976).
44. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
45. It has been argued that this result unnecessarily restricts the "market"
for water rights, since repayment of the federal obligation ends the
federal government's interest:
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On appeal the ninth circuit consolidated Yellen with an action
brought by the United States against the massive Imperial Irriga-
tion District.46 In the action against the district, the Bureau sought
a declaration that the 160-acre limit was applicable.
The residency action was reversed, the ninth circuit holding that
the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action. The
court, however, reaffirmed that the 160-acre limit was adopted to
"accomplish the redistribution of large privately owned tracts at
prices substantially below the actual value of such lands at the time
of sale, ' 47 and concluded that the excess land provisions are "an
important cornerstone of the reclamation laws."48 It then held the
acreage limitation applicable to the Imperial Irrigation District.
The court stated that the opinion letters of the Secretary of the
Interior regarding the meaning of the 1902 Act were entitled to
no deference, nor was the failure to enforce the Act in the past
an administrative determination to which the courts should defer. 49
As an outgrowth of this litigation, on August 25, 1977, pursuant
to the Court order in National Land for People,50 the Department
of the Interior published a proposed federal regulation for enforce-
ment of the acreage limitation.51 The regulation states that regula-
tions for enforcement of the residency requirement will be forth-
coming.
With respect to projects that have paid out fully, where
the distribution works have been turned over to the irrigators
or their associations, and where no rehabilitation or other Bu-
reau loans are outstanding-in short, where the Bureau no
longer has any financial interest in the project-its consent
to a transfer should not be required. Although the original
purpose of the reclamation program-to develop the West
with family-size farms-is impaired if the farmer can transfer
project water to non-farm uses, that purpose has been over-
taken by events. The increasing importance of municipal and
industrial uses in reclamation projects indicates tacit ac-
ceptance of changed economic conditions that make efforts to
perpetuate outmoded forms of economic organization futile
and inefficient.
C. MEyEs & R. PosNEa, supra note 4, at 20-21.
46. United States v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 322 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
rev'd, 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977). The Department of Interior had
chosen not to appeal the adverse decision of the district court. The
court of appeals, however, allowed several small farmers to intervene
and prosecute the appeal.
47. 559 F.2d at 521.
48. Id. at 527.
49. Id. at 537.
50. 417 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1976).
51. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044 (1977) (proposed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. pt.
426).
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The proposed regulation would have the following general ef-
fects: 52
1. It would limit a landowner to only one 160-acre farm, rather
than allowing him to have 160 acres in several different ir-
rigation districts.53
2. It would require that all future purchasers of excess land
in any project have their principal place of residence within a
radius of fifty miles of the land receiving project water. Ad-
ditionally, the Secretary has now determined that the resi-
dency requirement should be enforced on all projects receiv-
ing reclamation project water. Additional rules enforcing
this law are said to be forthcoming. 54
3. In the past multiple ownership arrangements have been ac-
ceptable if a loose family relationship existed among all
members, or if the multiple ownership had resulted in the
break up of large landholdings. The proposed rules tighten
these requirements by limiting multiple ownership arrange-
ments in future purchases of excess land to situations in
which a direct lineal family relationship exists among the
members. Thus, tenancies in common, corporations, partner-
ships, or trusts would be allowed only if the required family
relationship exists. Direct lineal family relationships are de-
fined as those between parents, children, grandchildren, or
grandparents. 55
4. The proposed rules and regulations would change current
leasing practices by prohibiting the purchaser of excess land
from leasing back to the seller of excess land, and by limit-
ing the number of acres an individual can lease to the
number he would be entitled to own.56
5. In addition to the requirements that the purchaser of excess
land obtain price approval from the Secretary of the In-
terior and prove he is not an excess land owner, the pur-
52. This brief summary is derived from a general reading of the regula-
tion as well as the explanatory memorandum distributed by the Bu-
reau of Reclamation. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 9-12.
53. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 9; 42 Fed. Reg. 43,046 (proposed; to
be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4(1) (2)).
54. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 9; 42 Fed. Reg. 43,046 (proposed; to
be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4 (k)).
55. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 10; 42 Fed. Reg. 43,047 (proposed;
to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.7).
56. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 10-11; 42 Fed. Reg. 43,047 (proposed;
to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.8).
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chaser will be chosen by lottery or other impartial means
with preference given those with family relationships to
the seller.57
6. In order to avoid the excess land provision, an individual
had previously been able to obtain project water for a ten-
year period by showing a "recordable contract" taking 'effect
ten years in the future. For all new contracts, the regulation
imposes a five-year disposition period.58
7. Under the proposed regulation, any purchaser of excess land
could not resell the land for a period of ten years without
approval of the Secretary as to price. After this ten-year
period and until half of the total construction costs allocated
to irrigation are paid, the Secretary will "monitor" resales
to prevent unreasonable profit from accruing to the seller.59
The possible impact which will result from enforcement of this
regulation is immense as the following chart reflecting excess lands
by state illustrates:
EXCESS LANDS BY STATE AS OF DECEMBER 1976
Ineligible for Project Water
Served
No. Owners Acres
Arizona 26 3,822
California 42 6,699
Colorado 5 672
Idaho 62 5,589
Kansas 0 0
Montana 99 12,625
Nebraska 90 8,619
Nevada 0 0
New Mexico 63 7,436
North Dakota 11 752
Oklahoma 3 434
Oregon 62 7,924
South Dakota 47 2,799
Texas 98 22,637
Utah 4 509
57. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 11; 42 Fed. Reg. 43,048 (proposed;
to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.10).
58. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 12; 42 Fed. Reg. 43,046 (proposed;
to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.5(a) (2)). For an explanation of "re-
cordable contract," see note 34 and accompanying text supra.
59. Memorandum, supra note 30, at 12-13; 42 Fed. Reg. 43,047-48 (pro-
posed; to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.9(b) ).
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Washington 76 6,658
Wyoming 73 8,013
TOTAL 761 95,188
Figures for the Imperial Irrigation District are not included,
due to the litigation. Past estimates indicate that up to fifty
percent of the District's 530,000 acres may be in excess status.
The California figures do not include all districts served from
the Pine Flat, Terminus, Success, and Isabella reservoirs.6 0
The figures on the chart do not reflect the impact of enforcement
of the residency requirement. When it is considered that the resi-
dency provision may apply to 150 reclamation projects serving
60. This chart is a condensed version of a chart entitled "Excess Lands
by State as of December 1976" which was obtained from Vernon S.
Cooper, Special Projects Officer, Division of Water and Land, Bureau
of Reclamation (Sept. 29, 1977).
The following exemptions from the 160-acre limit are listed in the
proposed regulation:
(b) Exceptions and modifications-(1) Exempt from acreage limitation.(i) Colorado-Big Thompson Project, Colorado, Act
of June 16, 1938 (52 Stat. 764, 43 U.S.C. 386).
(ii) Truckee Storage and Humboldt Projects, Ne-
vada, Act of November 29, 1940 (54 Stat. 1219).(iii) Owl Creek Unit, Missouri River Basin Project,
Act of August 28, 1954 (68 Stat. 890).
(iv) Santa Maria Project, California, Act of Sep-
tember 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1190).
(v) Beaverhead Valley, Montana, East Bench Unit,
Missouri River Basin Project, Act of July 24,
1957 (71 Stat. 309).
(vi) San Felipe Division, Central Valley Project,
California (North and South Santa Clara Sub-
areas only), Section 5, Act of August 27, 1967(81 Stat. 173, 43 U.S.C. 616fff-5).
(vii) Narrows Units, Missouri River Basin Project,Colorado, Act of August 28, 1970 (84 Stat. 830).
(2) Modifications of acreage limitation.(i) Projects constructed pursuant to the Water
Conservation and Utilization Act of August 11,
1939 (53 Stat. 1418, 16 U.S.C. 5902(2)), as
amended by the Act of October 14, 1940 (54
Stat. 1121).
(ii) San Luis Valley Project, Colorado, Act of June
27, 1952 (66 Stat. 282).
(iii) Nonexcess holding set at 480 irrigable acres,
Kendrick Project, Wyoming, Act of September
4, 1957 (71 Stat. 608).(c) Acreage equivalency-(1) Land equivalent to 120 acres of Class 1 land.
(i) Baker Project (Upper Division), Oregon, Act
of September 27, 1962 (76 Stat. 634, 43 U.S.C.
616u).
(2) Land equivalent to 130 acres of Class 1 land.
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(i) East Bench Unit (bench lands only), Missouri
River Basin Project, Montana, Act of July 24,
1957 (71 Stat. 309).
(3) Land equivalent to 160 acres of Class 1 land.
(i) Seedskadee Project, Wyoming, Act of August
28, 1958 (72 Stat. 963).
(ii) Savory-Pot Hook Project, Colorado-Wyoming,
Act of September 2, 1964 (78 Stat. 852, 43 U.S.C.
616jj).
(iii) Bostwick Park Project, Colorado, Act of Sep-
tember 2, 1964 (78 Stat. 852, 43 U.S.C. 616jj).(iv) Fruitland Mesa Project, Colorado, Act of Sep-
tember 2, 1964 (78 Stat. 852, 43 U.S.C. 616jj).
(v) Animas-La Plata Project, Colorado-New Mex-
ico, Act of September 30, 1968 (82 Stat. 885).
(vi) Dolores Project, Colorado, Act of September 30,
1968 (82 Stat. 885).
(vii) Dallas Creek Project, Colorado, Act of Sep-
tember 30, 1968 (82 Stat. 885).
(viii) San Miguel Project, Colorado, Act of Sep-
tember 30, 1968 (82 Stat. 885).
(ix) West Divide Project, Colorado, Act of Sep-
tember 30, 1968 (82 Stat. 885).
(x) Riverton Extension Unit, Missouri River Basin
Project, Wyoming, Act of September 25, 1970
(84 Stat. 861).
(xi) Polecat Bench Project, Wyoming, Act of March
11, 1976 (90 Stat. 205, 43 U.S.C. 615kkkk).
(xii) Pollock-Herried Project, South Dakota, Act of
March 11, 1976 (90 Stat. 208, 43 U.S.C. 6151111).
(xiii) Kanapolis Unit, Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin
Project, Kansas, Act of September 28, 1976 (90
Stat. 1324).
(xiv) Oroville-Tonasket Unit Extension, Chief Joseph
Dam Project, Washington, Act of September 28,
1976 (90 Stat. 1325).
(xv) Unitah Unit, Central Utah Project, Utah, Act
of September 28, 1976 (90 Stat. 1327).(xvi) Allen Camp Unit, Central Valley Project, Cal-
ifornia, Act of September 28, 1976 (90 Stat.
1328).
(d) Use of interest payment for excess lands.
(1) Washoe Project, California-Nevada, Act of August 1,
1956 (70 Stat. 775, 43 U.S.C. 614).
(2) Small Reclamation Projects, Act of August 6, 1956(70 Stat. 1044, 43 U.S.C. 422a-1), as amended.
(3) Mercedes Division, Lower Rio Grande Rehabilitation
Project, Texas, Act of April 7, 1958 (72 Stat. 82).
(4) La Feria Division, Lower Rio Grande Rehabilitation
Project, Texas, Act of September 22, 1959 (73 Stat.
641).
(e) Delivery of project water to certain categories of excess
lands.
(1) Involuntary acquisition of excess land
Ci) Act of July 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 524, 43 U.S.C.
423e, 544).
(2) Surviving spouse
Ci) Act of September 2, 1860 (74 Stat. 732, 43 U.S.C.
423h).
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eleven million acres of land in the seventeen Western states,61 the
impact of National Land for People and Yellen is certainly mind-
boggling.62
3. State Conditions Limiting Transferability
The states are not to be outdone by the federal government
in imposing conditions restricting the transferability of project
(3) Columbia Basin Project, Washington, Act of October
1, 1962 (76 Stat. 678, 16 U.S.C. 835-1, 835c).
(4) States, their political subdivisions and agencies there-
of, Act of July 7, 1970 (84 Stat. 411, 43 U.S.C. 425).
(5) Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California, Act of Au-
gust 10, 1972 (86 Stat. 531).
(f) Excess Land Provisions Modified by Acts of Congress
Authorizing Execution of Specific Contracts Negotiated
Pursuant to Section 7 of the Reclamation Project Act of
1939 (53 Stat. 1187, 43 U.S.C. 485f).
(1) Kittitas Reclamation District, Kittitas Division, Yak-
ima Project, Washington, Act of May 6, 1949 (63
Stat. 64).
(2) Prosser Irrigation District, Yakima Project, Wash-
ington, Act of October 27, 1949 (63 Stat. 943).
(3) Roza Irrigation Ristrict, Yakima Project, Washing-
ton, Act of June 30, 1954 (68 Stat. 359).
(4) Vale Oregon Irrigation District, Vale Project, Ore-
gon, Act of October 27, 1949 (63 Stat. 943).
(5) Frenchtown Irrigation District, Frenchtown Project,
Montana, Act of June 23, 1952 (66 Stat. 153).
(6) Owyhee Irrigation District, Gem Irrigation District,
Ridgeview Irrigation District, Advancement Irriga-
tion District, Payette-Oregon Slope Irrigation Dis-
trict, Crystal Irrigation District, Bench Irrigation
District, and Slide Irrigation District, Owyhee Proj-
ect, Idaho-Oregon, Act of June 23, 1952 (66 Stat.
152).
(7) Gering and Ft. Laramie Irrigation District, Goshen
Irrigation District, and Pathfinder Irrigation District,
North Platte Project, Nebraska-Wyoming, Act of
July 17, 1952 (66 Stat. 754).
(8) Hermiston Irrigation District and West Extension Ir-
rigation District, Umatilla Project, Oregon, Act of
June 18, 1954 (68 Stat. 254).
(9) North Unit Irrigation District -Deschutes Project,
Oregon, Act of August 10, 1954 (62 Stat. 679).
(10) American Falls Reservoir District No. 2, Minidoka
Project, Idaho, Act of August 21, 1954 (68 Stat. 762).
(11) Black Canyon Irrigation District, Boise Project,
Idaho, Act of August 24, 1954 (68 Stat. 794).
(12) Tulelake Irrigation District, Klamath Project, Cal-
ifornia-Oregon, Act of August 1, 1956 (70 Stat. 799).
42 Fed. Reg. 43,045-46 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.3)
(authors' outline structure).
61. The Bureau of Reclamation has not recently published any statistics
on the impact of the residency provision.
62. In December of 1977 the large farming interests demonstrated that
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water. State irrigation and conservancy districts are routinely
given power to determine who can use project water and under
what conditions the water should be apportioned in times -of short-
age.613 These delegations of power create internal state conflicts
over who has the power to approve a water right transfer. The
state engineer or state water board may wholeheartedly approve
a transfer of water right from one location to another and a change
in use from agriculture to industrial use, with such approval based
on the lack of impairment to junior appropriators. The irrigation
district, on the other hand, under its statutory authority may seek
to veto this transfer as inconsistent with the best interests of the
irrigation district. The unanswered and murky 64 legal question
concerns who has paramount authority over the allocation of water
rights within the district's boundaries. 65 Until this question is
answered, the potential for transfer of water rights within the
boundaries of an irrigation district is limited, since the transferor
and transferee are caught in a crossfire between the two state agen-
cies.66
C. State Statutory Provisions that Restrict the Transfer of Project
Water Rights
The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District was formed to pro-
vide flood protection and improve irrigation along the Rio Grande
River in central New Mexico. 67 The project is similar to projects
they, too, can use federal law to advantage. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of California issued an injunction
against the proposed federal regulation until an environmental impact
statement is prepared. County of Fresno v. Andrus, [1977] 8 ENVra.
REP. (BNA) 1247 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1977) (Civ. No. 77-202). The
Secretary of the Interior has elected not to appeal this decision. Prep-
aration of this statement is expected to take about a year. [1977] 8
ENVI. REP. (BNA) at 1382-83.
63. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-28-28 (1968). For a discussion of gen-
eral local laws, see C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at AI-1.
Citations to all of the state and local irrigation and conservancy dis-
trict laws can be found in A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS(R. Dewsnup & D. Jensen eds., National Water Commission 1973).
64. See C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 25.
65. See § rn-C of text and accompanying notes infra.
66. For a good general discussion of these types of conservancy district
controversies, see NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR
THE FUTURE 266-71 (1973) and C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note
4, at 25.
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 75, art. 28 (1968 & Supp. 1975). The Middle
Rio Grande Conservancy District extends from the Cochiti Indian
Pueblo on the Rio Grande River north of Albuquerque, New Mexico,
to the village of San Marcial at the northern end of Elephant Butte
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throughout the West. Its irrigated lands amount to approximately
55,000 acres. The construction of the project works was made
possible by a loan from the United States through the Bureau of
Reclamation. As security for the loan, all project works were
deeded to the United States. 8 The Conservancy District Board
contends that it has the power to veto any transfer of surface water
rights within its boundaries. The state engineer contests this juris-
diction and the water users of the district are by and large bewild-
ered.6 9
The district's need to assert authority over transfers stems from
pressure from non-agricultural water users who wish to purchase
water rights and transfer them outside the district.70 The district,
and all those who wish to see the district lands remain irrigable,
advance the following arguments:
1. There are no longer any private waters free from regulation
by the district. Persons who had water rights which pre-date
the district maintained their right only to "such use as could
be made of such waters if the improvements of the district
had not been made."71 Irrigable acreage decreased in the
area every year until the project was constructed. If nature
had taken its course, by 1977 no irrigable acreage would have
existed. Therefore, if one is entitled only to the private wa-
ter rights that would exist today if the project had not been
Reservoir near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. It measures ap-
proximately 150 miles in length and varies in width from one to five
miles.
68. Copies of these deeds are on file in the Middle Rio Grande Conser-
vancy District office in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
69. Interview with Albino El6isa Escamilla, ditch water users and commu-
nity leaders in the south valley of Albuquerque, New Mexico (Sept.
1977).
70. The pattern of increasing market values for water rights is docu-
mented in R. Khoshakhlagh, F. Brown & C. DuMars, Forecasting Fu-
ture Market Values of Water Rights in New Mexico (Final Report
to N.M. Water Resources Research Inst., WRRI Project No. 3109-209,
July 1977).
71. The position is supported by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-28-26(3) (1968)
which provides:
The rights of persons or public corporations and of other users
of water, to the waters in and of the district for irrigation,
water supply, industrial purposes, water power, or for any
other purposes, shall extend only to such rights as were
owned by them or their predecessors prior to their inclusion
in the district; and to such use as could be made of such wa-
ters if the improvements of the districts had not been made.
Id. (emphasis added).
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built, then there would be no private water rights because
there would have been no land to irrigate.
2. Even if prior rights do exist, the district's power to control all
waters within the district stems from a state statute which
provides: "Persons, public corporations and others desiring
to secure such use of the waters or watercourses of the dis-
trict, or of the district rights therein, may make application to
the board for permission to lease, or purchase for such
use."'7 2  This statute clearly confers power to regulate not
only "district [water] rights" but also all other private rights
in the "waters or watercourses" within the district."3
3. Although the state legislature recognized there may exist
vested irrigation rights within the district,
nevertheless, in the proper operation of such districts, and
especially in time of droughts, it is essential that the districts
have the specific and unquestioned power to distribute the
water remaining available for irrigation and to properly allo-
cate the same for the purposes most essential for the welfare
and economy of landowners within the district.74
4. Because the district has a "perpetual lien" on all of the real
property of the district 75 and because the conservancy statute
includes water rights within the definition of "real prop-
72. Id. § 75-28-26(9).-
73. Id.
74. Id. § 75-28-28 (emphasis added). This statute provides in its entirety:
It is recognized that in conservancy districts heretofore or
hereafter organized under New Mexico law that certain land
therein has or may have vested irrigation water rights. While
fully recognizing such rights, nevertheless, in the proper oper-
ation of such districts, and especially in time of droughts, it
is essential that the districts have the specific and unques-
tioned power to distribute the water remaining available for
irrigation and to properly allocate the same for the purposes
most essential for the welfare and economy of landowners
within the district. To this end, the legislature deems it of
manifest importance that conservancy districts have the un-
questioned power to make such distributio and allocation of
irrigation waters. While such power is present in existing
laws, the method of enforcement is doubtful. To avoid any
question in the future, this act [sections 75-28-28 to 75-28-
32] is enacted, with the aforesaid legislative intent and policy
in mind.
Id. (emphasis added). This statute is supported by id. § 75-28-29,
which authorizes the district to distribute all of the waters of the dis-
trict, id. § 75-28-30, which allows the district to promulgate written
regulations for the allocation procedures, and id. § 75-28-32, which
makes it a misdemeanor to violate these regulations.
75. This position is supported by id. § 75-32-10 which provides:
All assessments levied to meet any indebtedness due or to
become due to the United States pursuant to the reclamation
law, rules and regulations, a reclamation contract or notices
or statements issued by the Secretary of the Interior there-
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erty,"' 7 6 its consent must be obtained before any transfer of
water rights.
All of these arguments are being tested in a recent and poten-
tially 'explosive New Mexico case. 77 If these arguments prevail,
Western state conservancy and irrigation district laws will add yet
another layer of statutory maze which the potential purchaser must
work through to acquire a water right in a project funded by the
Bureau of Reclamation and operated by a state conservancy dis-
trict.
IV. IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONDITIONS
ON THE MARKET FOR WATER RIGHTS
All of the legal battles which have been fought, or which will
be fought, give encouragement to those concerned about future em-
under, together with all interest on all assessments and penal-
ties for default in payment of the same, and all costs in col-
lecting the same, shall from the date on which there is filed
in the office of the assessor of the county in which is situated
the property upon which such assessment is made a certified
copy of the resolution of the board determining the amount
of money to be raised, fixing the rate of such assessments
and making a levy therefor, shall constitute a perpetual lien
upon all the district real property against which such assess-
ments shall be so levied, to which only the lien for general
or special state, county, city, town, village or school taxes
shall be paramount, and no sales of such property to enforce
any general or special state, county, city, town, village, school
tax or other lien shall extinguish the perpetual lien of such
assessments nor extinguish the liability of such property to
future assessment for payment of any indebtedness to the
United States provided for in a reclamation contract; and ev-
ery other assessment hereafter levied upon any real property
within the district, under the provisions of this act [sections
75-32-1 to 75-32-24], is and shall be a lien upon the property
against which such assessment is levied. All such assessments
shall be collected, and all such liens shall be enforced in the
same manner as assessments of taxes for state and county
purposes are collected and the liens thereof are enforced.
Id. (emphasis added). See also id. § 75-32-19; id. § 75-4-11.
Section 75-4-11 provides:
In all cases where the rights of owners of land in this state
to which water rights on interstate streams are appurtenant
have been the subject of litigation in the state or federal
courts of an adjoining state, it shall be the duty of the state
engineer to assume control of all or any part of such inter-
state stream and of the diversion and distribution of the wa-
ters thereof and to administer the same in the public interest.
Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to con-
servancy districts, irrigation districts or federal reclamation
projects in this state.
Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. § 75-28-3. The state engineer bases his argument on id. § 75-
5-2 which requires that he approve all surface water transfers.
77. In re Cox, No. 7147 (D.N.M. filed Sept. 5, 1977), appealing No. 02377A
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ployment for lawyers. But what impact will they have on those
people who need water for domestic, municipal, and industrial
uses? 78
Water will probably never be traded in a "perfect market" with
"perfect information" resulting in "pareto-optima" market alloca-
tions79 where all water is placed in its most efficient use. However,
the exact opposite circumstance exists with reclamation water.8 0
The legal impediments built around irrigation uses make it im-
possible for water to reflect its true market value.8 '
& RG-10591 (Office of N.M. State Engineer, filed Dec. 4, 1975). The
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District filed a protest against the
Cox application to change the point of diversion, and the place and
purpose of an irrigation water right to an underground use.
78. In the past, the problem of allocation of water in the Rocky Mountain
states and in the West was considered a regional problem not worthy
of national concern. In the 1970's, however, a number of events and
movements have combined to change this situation. What formerly
peemed important only in a parochial, regional context has become
mportant nationally, as well.
The most dramatic event precipitating this change in status was
the oil embargo of 1973, which focused national attention on the West
as the location for large, domestic deposits of energy fuels-uranium,
coal, and oil shale. Since virtually all processing of these fuels into
subsequent energy forms requires large quantities of water, the atten-
tion of national strategists was drawn to the water resources of the
region.
79. d'Arge, Coase Theorem Symposium: Introduction, 13 NAT. RESOURCESJ., 557 (1973). A pareto-optimal or "pareto efficient" market is one
in which "no one can be made better off without simultaneously mak-
ing someone else worse off, given initial endowments of all parties."
Id. at 557. In simple ftrms, this means a market in which all com-
modities are sold at the highest price that the free market can bring.
80. The West is approaching a condition in which the renewable supplies
of water are fully utilized and the geological stocks of groundwater
have become financially more expensive to obtain. The emerging pat-
tern is that of a scarce resource whose low cost supplies have been
fully allocated among a variety of competing uses and whose remain-
ing physical stocks are steadily increasing in economic costs. Yet,
most of the West is growing rapidly, both in terms of population and
in economic activity. Energy development alone will provide a sus-
tained stimulus to the region for the remainder of this century and
well into the next. Associated with this increased movement of people
and industry into the West will be an increase in the demand for water.
As these new water uses are superimposed upon the emerging pattern
of full appropriation, stresses are inevitable. In the absence of new
additions to the water supply of the region, new uses can be accom-
modated only by retiring old uses or by turning to other, more costly,
sources. However, project uses cannot be retired to meet this demand.
81. Some would argue "true market value" should not be at issue. It
is true that any time water is involved there are fundamental ques-
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The residency requirement and the 160-acre limitation, if en-
forced, will operate to exclude domestic and industrial bidders from
the market. Without looking much further than the natural gas
controversy one can see the negative impacts of over regulating
natural resource development.
Many deep-well irrigation farmers in southern New Mexico rely
on natural gas as their exclusive fuel for powering their irrigation
pumps. Over the past three years the Federal Power Commission
price for natural gas has increased dramatically. The farmers now
tions of equity that must be answered; none are answered by treating
water as a commodity to be traded on the open market. Conversely,
these issues are not addressed by the maze of overlapping state and
federal laws that currently regulate reclamation water. The following
questions are a matter of concern: why should proximity to a natural
resource confer a greater share of the benefits from its use; why should
historical priority in the use of a natural resource confer a continuing
role as primary beneficiary of the use of the resource; and should
the fact that some resource claimants are in an economically inferior
condition to others bear upon the resolution of the equity issue? These
are profoundly difficult questions, and no attempt will be made to
resolve them here. But in considering different possible solutions to
the equity issue surrounding water in the West, the importance of these
ethical questions requires that some consideration be given them.
Some are adamantly opposed to free and open market transfers
of water on philosophical grounds. There is a certain philosophy of
a rural agrarian life, which has many strong adherents in the West
and elsewhere. To proponents of this view, the value of maintaining
a strong agricultural way of life cannot be captured by any formula
which purpbrts to establish a greater economic value to be gained
from shifting water to non-agricultural uses. This-point of view is
most illuminating, and finds its broadest base of support, when it
points to the transient nature of energy activity within the region.
The argument is made that each of the principal energy resources
of the region-oil, natural gas, coal, uranium and oil shale-are non-
renewable and therefore exhaustible. Extending this argument, it
would be foolish to allow the withering of the region's permanent
economic base in pursuit of a rich, but short-lived, transient industry.
It would be better to mandate that new water demands be met from
the unused stocks of groundwater even with the higher cost incurred.
On the other hand, the population of much of the region is eco-
nomically poor, as measured by per capita income and othier indi-
cators. A common aspiration of many of these people is for substan-
tial economic improvement, which has the implicit requirement that
a scarce resource, such as water, should move to its most economically
valuable use. For proponents of this view, an inflexible system of
water allocation may be a serious obstacle to fulfillment of their as-
pirations. From this perspective, the existing system for managing
water allocation is excessively cumbersome and complex, and per-
petuates economic inefficiency by maintaining existing patterns of wa-
ter use when economically more attractive re-allocations could be
made.
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argue that they cannot stand a higher natural gas price and remain
in business. Under current irrigation practices the cost to switch
to another fuel or to change irrigation practices is extremely high.
The farmers contend that had they known the Federal Power Com-
mission would allow the price of natural gas to rise to such a
high level they would not have made the substantial capital
investment they presently have. On the other hand, the municipal
interests and residential consumers contend that they will pay
too much if the farmers' subsidy is not ended, and new supplies
are not developed.
The present status of reclamation water can be summarized as
a situation in which (1) certain bidders are excluded from the
market, and (2) the market value of the commodity is extremely
unclear because of potential for future litigation at both the
federal and state level.
This type of market insulation like the past Federal Power
Commission control of natural gas will maintain water for those
protected at an artificially low price. As the West approaches full
appropriation, with continued restrictions on market operation,
a number of results may be expected.
First, there are not likely to be sufficient incentives for the
introduction of water conserving technologies into agriculture, or
for the development of new supplies. Nor can it be expected that
industrial or domestic users will plan wisely, since they have no
real idea of what the price for water will be, when and if the
market restrictions are lifted.
Second, when the restrictions are finally lifted, by legislation
or court decision, the dramatic price increase will have far reaching
ramifications for a suddenly failing irrigation industry unable to
compete for its one essential ingredient-water. Neither the agri-
cultural economy of the West nor the municipal and industrial
users can stand the market-wrenching effects of this type of price
fluctuation.
V. PRIVATE OR NATIVE WATER8 2
The market for project water is increasingly insulated, resulting
in artificially low prices. In sharp contrast is the market for non-
82. Private water or native water is defined as nonproject water. Water
that has been appropriated under state law is not subject to the re-
strictions of the Bureau of Reclamation or any state or local water
districts.
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project water which is inefficiently carrying high transaction costs
and thus greatly inflated prices.
Considered separately, the problems of each of the two markets
are serious. The insulation of one market and great inflation of the
other, together have a strong tendency to worsen the problems of
each. The inflation of the native water market is increased because
for most purchasers project water is not available at any price.8 3
Furthermore, the higher the prices for available water are driven,
the greater the danger if the insulation around project waters is
suddenly removed (either by litigation or congressional enactment).
Although some might argue that inflation in the native water
market is good because it will force a breakthrough that will open
up reclamation waters to all purchasers,8 4 a different view seems
more appropriate.
The higher the price of native water, the greater the hardship
created by suddenly excluding land from the project water market.
The high price of water to industry and municipalities may enable
that sector to increase its litigation and lobbying activities, but the
same high price destroys all alternatives for present users of project
water should, their market be suddenly opened to the high bids of
industry and municipalities.
There will be less waste of congressional time and less risk of
sudden changes bringing drastic and destructive price fluctuations
if the two disparate water markets can each be brought closer to
pareto-optomality 8 5 -thereby reducing the discrepancy between
them. Not only would this benefit each market considered sep-
arately, but it would greatly reduce those unique risks caused by
the mounting tension between the two.8 6 The wasteful inflation
83. See § III of text supra.
In October, 1977, Charles DuMars interviewed, in confidence, a ma-jor water broker in Albuquerque, New Mexico, who stated that the
jurisdictional conflict between the state engineer and the Conservancy
Board had totally destroyed the market for conservancy district water
rights. The market price in his view was zero. R. Khoshaklagh, F.
Brown & C. DuMars, supra note 70, at 101, however, show the market
value of water rights outside the conservancy district to be $786.16
per acre foot.
84. It is argued that those excluded from the project water market will
have no economically feasible alternatives, and will thus use their
political power to induce Congress to make needed changes in the
Reclamation Act, whereas less expensive alternatives will delay the
modernization of reclamation laws.
85. See note 79 supra.
86. The unique risks are the sudden large upward swing in the price of
project water if Congress should suddenly remove restrictions, to-
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in the native water market should be reduced in any case. But
it is all the more important to do so now that the courts and the
Department of the Interior seem about to exclude some 95,000 acres
of irrigated land from the project water market.8 7
The problems of the two markets are very different. The prob-
lem of the project water market is, of course, the absolute exclusion
of most potential buyers. The problem of the native water market
is high, 'even enormous, transaction costs. A significant amount of
research on the problems of the native water market has already
been published.8   Meyers and Posner have observed that, unlike
the native market, the project water market operates without high
transaction costs.8 9 Their analysis furnishes valuable insight into
the kind of changes needed to reduce transaction costs in the native
water market.
A. Improving the Market Allocation of Native Water
Project water is usually sold to or controlled by conservancy
districts or irrigation districts. These districts allocate to the indi-
vidual irrigators. Generally, the water rights allocated by a single
district are completely fungible. They can be easily and inexpen-
sively transferred to any other irrigator in the same district. As
Meyers and Posner note, "mutualization or unitization of a shared
water resource avoids problems of quantification and of return flow
-the chief difficulties in most attempted transfers." 0
The more a state's water allocation system can be made like that
of a mutual ditch company or conservation district, the more trans-
action costs will be reduced and the more efficiency will be pro-
moted. The two sources of almost all the huge and avoidable trans-
action costs in Western native water right transfers are quantifica-
tion and return flow problems.9 1 It is, however, possible to sub-
stantially reduce quantification costs and avoid return flow prob-
lems altogether.
gether with resulting hardships to irrigators using such water.
87. See table accompanying note 60 supra.
88. See L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra note 3; J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DE-
HAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, supra note 3, at 32-82; C. MEYERS & R. POSNER,
supra note 4; Ellis, Water Transfer Problems: Law, in WATER RE-
SEARCH 233 (A. Kneese & S. Smith eds. 1966); Trelease, Changes and
Transfer of Water Rights, 13 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. 507
(1967).
89. See C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 36.
90. Id. at 35.
91. Id. These two concepts are taken from Meyers and Posner. Quantifi-
cation refers to the process of defining the quantum of the transferred
right.
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The reasons these two enemies of market efficiency came into
existence will be briefly set out. In water scarce areas, it was felt
necessary to grant firm property rights in the water supply in order
to induce financial and other forms of reliance in those who it was
hoped would invest their lives and fortunes in settling and develop-
ing the area.9 2 It was thought important to change that aspect of
Eastern riparian water law that allowed those coming later to have
as good a right as those who had developed and first relied. Only
a seemingly inexhaustible supply could induce reliance without pro-
tection from unknown future claimants. The Western water supply
was patently exhaustible.
The answer to these needs was the system known as prior appro-
priation. It made reliance possible by creating a priority list. The
would-be developer was told that under state law no future claim-
ant could infringe his ability to obtain water. Therefore, he could
examine the source of supply and the claimants ahead of him on the
priority list and make a rational decision whether or not to invest
his time and money.93
It is desirable to protect past reliance and to continue to make
such reliance possible. Therefore, in seeking ways to make market
transfers of water rights more efficient, the basic reasons for prior
appropriation water law must continue to be served. With this un-
derstanding, the arch enemies of market efficiency-expensive
quantification and return flow problems-can be considered.
B. Quantification
The best examples of both good and bad quantification are found
in Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co.9 4 The fact that Green is one of the
most analyzed of water law cases, and yet no previous analysis has
disclosed its worst evils (including an analysis by one of the au-
thors95), is a humbling demonstration of where much of the prob-
lem lies.
Green is the conclusion of a story that began when the city com-
92. See Ciriacy-Wantrup, Water Economics: Relations to Law and Policy,
in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 397, 413-30 (R. Clark ed. 1967). The
author discusses the "dichotomy of criteria (security and flexibility)."
Id. at 413.
93. For a general discussion of the reasons underlying the development
of Western prior appropriation water law, see F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW
24-26 n.1 (2d ed. 1974) (quoting McGown, The Development of Politi-
cal Institutions on the Public Domain, 11 Wyo. L.J. 8, 14 (1956)).
94. 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
95. See Ellis, supra note 88, at 237, 241, 246. Green is discussed through-
out the article.
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missioners of Fort Collins, Colorado, talked Milton Hoffman and
Lydia Hoffman Morrison into selling part of their water right. A
judicial decree stated they were entitled to a sixteen cubic foot per
second water right to irrigate seventy-two acres of described land.
Hoffman delivered a deed assigning Fort Collins a right to divert
eight cubic feet per second. Hoffman planned to continue irrigating
a portion of his seventy-two acres.9 6
Fort Collins began the routine procedure necessary to transfer
the water right it had purchased to its intake pipes, thirteen miles
upstream from the Hoffman-Morrison farm. The Colorado Su-
preme Court approved the method by which the trial court had
quantified the Hoffman water right, that is, had determined just
how much water the right allowed its owner to consume.97 For
this purpose the court (like virtually all courts and agencies today)
used the Blaney-Criddle formula.9 8
The Blaney-Criddle formula ignores the size of ditches and does
not employ any water measurement inputs. The formula calculates
how much water should (in good husbandry) be used on a specific
soil by considering the distance from the stream, the altitude above
sea level, the length of growing season, and the type of crops grown
on the soil.99
Using the formula, the trial court found that the amount of wa-
ter historically consumed by the Hoffman-Morrison farm was
ninety-five acre feet per year. The court then found from the evi-
dence that Fort Collins would consume fifty percent of the water
it diverted out of the stream; the other fifty percent would return to
the stream as return flow. The trial court concluded that Fort Col-
lins could divert 190 acre feet (twice ninety-five),100 This quan-
tification was necessary to be certain that the net effect of Fort
Collins' use of the Hoffman right after transfer was no more dam-
aging to the stream than the Hoffman's use had been before the
transfer. 10 '
This is the positive aspect of quantification; the guarantee of
the prior appropriation system was maintained by the courts. Late-
96. This is an important point and is clearly established in the literature.
See L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra note 3, at 28. The authors
state, "[i]t was found during court proceedings that Hoffman intended
to continue irrigating his land with the remaining 7.815 c.f.s." Id.
97. 150 Colo. at 105, 371 P.2d at 782.
98. The Blaney-Criddle formula is fully explained in Blaney & Criddle,
Determining Water Requirements for Settling Water Disputes, 4 NAT.
REsoURcEs J. 29 (1964).
99. Id. at 32-33.
100. 150 Colo. at 101, 371 P.2d at 780.
101. Id. at 103,.371 P.2d at 781.
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comers, including subsequent purchasers, could not adversely affect
the rights already perfected.
The negative aspect of quantification is that Fort Collins was
forced to employ experts to examine the Hoffman farm and apply
the Blaney-Criddle formula if it wanted to know how much water
Hoffman had for sale.10 2  This is a transaction cost that does not
exist in any but the Western water market. Furthermore, Fort Col-
lins had the expense of litigation. In quantification the cost of ex-
perts to determine consumptive use is always present, and the cost
of litigation is frequently present.
Green also discloses the potential for unfairness that lurks in
the problem of quantification. In the course of the trial, protesting
neighbors brought out the fact that at no time had an amount of
water in excess of eight cubic feet per second been applied to bene-
ficial use on the Hoffman-Morrison land. 0 3
Since the deed to the city specified eight cubic feet, it was con-
cluded by 'everyone (apparently even Hoffman's attorney) that the
entire water right had been sold, even though it is clear that at
the time he signed the deed Hoffman thought he was selling only
part of his right. 0 4 This result appears to be an injustice to Hoff-
man, brought about by basic confusions within the legal system.
At the time Hoffman executed the deed and delivered it to Fort
Collins no one knew the quantum of the Hoffman water right. The
only official document in existence was a judicial decree, issued in
1882, which mistakenly described the Hoffman right as a "16 cubic
feet per second" water right. 0 5 The phrase "16 cubic feet per sec-
ond" describes only a rate of flow; it does not describe a quantity
of water. The effect a sixteen-second-foot right will have on a
stream depends entirely upon how often and long the headgate is
left open.
This inadequate description did not cause a problem in an agri-
cultural setting because the decree also stated that Hoffman could
only irrigate a described seventy-two acres with his water right.10
It was probably impossible for Hoffman to consume much more
than ninety-five acre feet on his seventy-two acres because the rest
would return to the stream.10 7
102. L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra note 3, at 29.
103. 150 Colo. at 104, 371 P.2d at 782.
104. See note 96 supra.
105. 150 Colo. at 100, 371 P.2d at 780.
106. L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra note 3, at 27.
107. This method of controlling the quantum of an irrigation water right
is called the doctrine of enlarged uses and is discussed briefly in Beck
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Despite the popular belief of farmers and lawyers alike, the
quantum of the Hoffman water right was not described by the feet
per acre language of the decree; it was described by the seventy-two
acres of specifically described land language of the decree. 0 8 And
of course the description of the land did not reveal the quantum of
the right until the Blaney-Criddle formula was applied. The carry-
ing capacity of the ditch is immaterial in that formula. 10 9
When the number on the decree is sixteen and the deed specifies
eight, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the parties intended
to transfer one-half of the water right. For centuries the legal pro-
fession has dealt with the problem of ambiguity in a deed." 0 Why
was it not recognized in Hoffman's case?
In addition to market inefficiencies, the prior appropriation sys-
tem holds great potential for unfairness of the type suffered by
Mr. Hoffman. Almost all transfers today are from irrigation to in-
dustry or municipalities. The vague way of describing the quantum
of a right that was appropriate for irrigation is inadequate and often
misleading in any other context. If Hoffman had sold his right to a
neighbor who intended to irrigate seventy-two acres, he would have
known full well that he was selling all of his water right. If it
had been his intention to sell only half he would have specified
that he was selling enough of his right to irrigate thirty-six acres.
But in dealing with a city, Hoffman could not use this traditional
method of limiting the quantum of irrigation water rights. It was
unfortunate that at the time the deed was signed no one knew the
quantum of the Hoffman water right in terms meaningful for mu-
nicipal use, but a greater unfairness arose because everyone appar-
ently thought they knew.
The limitations of the water right records presently available
must of course be understood. Beyond this, however, ways should
be sought to reduce these limitations by making reasonable im-
provements in the records that define water rights."'
C. Reducing the Cost of Necessary Quantification
Today, when most transfers of water are from irrigation to in-
dustrial and municipal uses, quantification by rate of flow and de-
& Clyde, The Colorado Doctrine: Surface Water Rights by Appropria-
tion Only § 410.2, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 131 (R. Clark ed.
1972).
108. L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra note 3, at 27.
109. See Blaney & Criddle, supra note 98.
110. See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.86 (A. Casner ed.
1952).
111. See R. DEWSNUP, IMPROVEMENT OF STATE WATER RIGHTS REcoRDs 1-
10 (National Water Commission 1971).
TWO-TIERED MARKET
scription of the land irrigated is inadequate. The State of New
Mexico has for decades officially defined water rights in terms of
the number of acre feet that can be diverted each irrigation season
or year.112 This figure has been determined in the New Mexico
State Engineer's Office by use of the Blaney-Criddle formula.'"3
Most irrigators have been willing to accept the accuracy of the engi-
neer's determination, so that transfer protests are usually limited
to the question of whether or not water has actually been put to
beneficial use on the seller's farm.
It could well be that states that have not historically determined
the quantum of irrigation water rights in any reliable way would
be spending more money to do so than the resulting increase in
market efficiency would justify. However, the process may not be
as expensive as it first appears. Instead of analyzing every farm
in the state, the New Mexico State Engineer has successfully ap-
plied the Blaney-Criddle formula to entire drainage basins that
have common soil types, cropping patterns, etc."-'
New Mexico has adopted an additional, if small, 'efficiency. Un-
like the Colorado courts,"r5 the New Mexico State Engineer has not
individually calculated the losses from each ditch. All farms in
a given area are allowed the same carriage loss whether their
ditches are long or short. The result is that carriage losses do not
have to be calculated in defining the seller's property right. In
analyzing an irrigated river valley, the New Mexico State Engineer
ignores the length of ditches as long as they are not unreasonably
wasteful."16 The New Mexico method can reduce the cost of quan-
tification significantly.
D. Return Flow-The Intractable Problem
Return flow problems cannot be solved. They are not solved
by state engineers who reduce the transferred right by half (or by
112. Letter from Richard Simms, General Counsel, N.M. State Engineer &
N.M. Interstate Stream Comm'n, to W.H. Ellis (Feb. 6, 1978) (on
file in the library of Willis H. Ellis).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
The courts added five acre feet to the transferred water right because
the trial court found "[tihat in addition to the 90 acre feet of water
consumed on this land, five acre feet are lost by evaporation and seep-
age while the water is in transit from the headgate of the Coy Ditch
to the Hoffman-Morrison farm." Id. at 101, 371 P.2d at 780.
116. Letter from Richard Simms, General Counsel, N.M. State Engineer &
N.M. Interstate Stream Comm'n, to W.H. Ellis (Feb. 20, 1978) (on
file in the library of Willis H. Ellis).
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any other factor),17 and they cannot be solved by letting buyers
sell the increased return flow created by their transfer." 8
It is necessary at the outset to understand what a return flow
problem is. All return flow problems involve a physical sequencing
of water rights on a stream in such a way that a junior right will
receive water when one or more rights senior to it do not. This
can occur only when the junior is just below the return flow of
a very senior right and the senior rights not receiving water are
all higher (above) on the stream.
! Direction
1of Flow
3 4
Each number on this chart represents that right's position on the
priority list-i having the highest priority. When stream flow is
small, rights 2 and 3 will have to let all the flow go by to 1, but 4
will be able to take all of 1's return flow. If this situation was
created voluntarily as a result of the order in which rights 1
through 4 were originally perfected, it does not constitute a prob-
lem. The guarantees of the prior appropriation system are main-
tained even though 4 gets water when 2 and 3 do not. When 2
and 3 made their decisions to risk time and money on their respec-
tive locations, 1 was already there and they knew full well that
they would have to allow water to flow down to 1 when the stream
was low enough.
If, however, the situation described above is created by a trans-
fer, a return flow problem is brought about because rights 2 and
3 are impaired vis-a-vis 4. Similarly, if historical development of
the area created the described situation and a transfer takes right
1 and its return flow away so that right 4 no longer receives its
benefit, a return flow problem is brought about because right 4
is impaired vis-a-vis 2 and 3. In each case the recognition of a re-
turn flow problem is deemed necessary to protect junior right own-
117. It is frequently asserted in the literature that state administrators
"solve" the return flow problem by reducing the transferred right so
that after transfer the purchaser can divert as much as his vendor
had consumed. L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra note 3, at 19. In
most irrigation settings this would be a 50 percent reduction.
118. This "solution" is suggested in L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra
note 3, at 11, and C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 36, 47.
TWO-TIERED MARKET
ers who have relied upon the conditions in existence when they per-
fected their rights.
There is no really satisfactory solution for this problem within
the prior appropriation system. Some state engineers try to protect
impaired junior rights by reducing the quantum of the transferred
right." 9 If efficient allocation of water is an important desideratum
of a water law system (and it certainly is), this solution may be
worse than the problem. The purchaser must buy (and the seller
sell) twice as much water as he is allowed to take his place of use.
Furthermore, any attempt to solve a return flow problem by
reducing the quantum of the transferred right is not only destructive
of market efficiency, it is not an accurate method of protecting the
injured junior right. The return flow deficit suffered by a junior
right is not a constant. It varies inversely with stream flow. 120
The state engineer who reduces the transferred right by fifty per-
cent is overcorrecting part of the time and undercorrecting part of
the time.
Hartman and Seastone have suggested that efficiency can be re-
stored by allowing the purchaser to sell the amount of his purchase
which he is not permitted to use, 12 1 or more precisely, the additional
water that is in the stream because of his transfer.
It is true that after such a transfer there is sometimes more wa-
ter in the stream because the transferred right is curtailed to protect
those who are bypassed. However, it is unlikely that any state en-
gineer will ever allow a sale of increased return flow because the
amount of surplus water left in the stream as a result of the trans-
fer is also not a constant; it changes in direct proportion to the
stream flow. 122 If the means to accurately measure stream flow
exist, the state engineer could presumably calculate the extra water
available at that moment. The problem would be in administering
a priority right that is constantly changing in amount. Even if
an administrative agency were willing to take on such a job, the
irrigation season would be over before it really knew how much
return flow could be safely sold. It might also be difficult to ex-
plain to prospective buyers what it was that was being offered for
sale.
E. Avoiding Return Flow Problems
Quite by accident, New Mexico has largely avoided return flow
problems, and by some changes in law could avoid them altogether.
119. See note 117 supra.
120. See Ellis, supra note 88, at 245.
121. See L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, supra note 3, at 11.
122. See Ellis, supra note 88, at 246.
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The New Mexico law of surface water is nominally prior appro-
priation law. However, priorities in most instances are not enforced
in New Mexico. The original reason for this state of affairs is that
fewer than half the water rights in the state have ever been adjudi-
cated, so that the state engineer does not have an authoritative pri-
ority list on which to base enforcement. The New Mexico State
Engineer rarely shuts junior headgates to make water available for
senior ditches. What happens instead is a hodge-podge of local cus-
toms, proration agreements between ditches and, in some areas, sim-
ple, raw taking by those in a physical position to do so.
The only thing that has kept this situation from disintegrating
into mayhem or civil war is the fact that-unlike some Western
states-New Mexico from an early date has limited the number of
rights to water from a given stream.'1 2 3 The developer's risk of
time and money has not been protected in New Mexico by guaran-
teeing him a specific place in a priority list; it has been protected
by limiting the number and quantity of water rights to a level that
the stream could satisfy.
It would seem, at least in theory, that such a system could not
exist in a state like Colorado. In Colorado no limitation has ever
been placed upon the number of surface rights.12 4 The reliance
of Colorado water right owners has been protected by immediate
administrative enforcement of priority. Setting aside constitutional
questions, one would fear that prorating shortages in Colorado
would let all the hundreds of rights on the bottom of the priority
list take water and thus destroy the senior rights and the agricul-
tural economy of the state. However, it must be the case in Colo-
rado that all those hundreds of rights at the bottom of priority
lists have long ago partially or entirely ceased to exist under the
doctrine of abandonment. These rights exist only on paper.
One thing is certain. Riparian states that experience water
shortages in the future have a different allocation method to con-
sider than just the additional prior appropriation system. The sys-
tem suggested by the New Mexico experience is a better system
for arid and water short regions than prior appropriation.
The characteristics of the system advocated are:
1. There would be a limit on the number and size of the rights
123. A permit to acquire surface water rights has been required in New
Mexico since 1907. 1907 N.M. Laws ch. 49 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 75-5-1 to -37 (1968 & Supp. 1975)).
124. See G. RADOsEVIcH, K. NOBE, D. ALLARDICE & C. KIEKWOOD, EVOLUTION
AND ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER LAW: 1876-1976, 27-29
(1976).
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to take water from each surface stream in the state. The
limitation should be such that the worst foreseeable shortage
when prorated would still furnish enough water to each right
owner to have some economic value.
2. There would be no priority between rights. Instead all
rights would share equally in the burden of shortage-prora-
tion.
3. The economic effects of shortage would be buffered. Under
prior appropriation a senior right owner who cannot stand
shortage need purchase no water to augment his supply until
shortages reach the point at which his headgate is closed and
then he must purchase enough to replace his entire right.
Under proration, the same owner would have to purchase ad-
ditional water more often, but he would never have to re-
place his entire right.
4. Because the effects of shortage are buffered, proration is
more appropriate in areas where temporary, high water use,
energy developments are taking place. There is less likeli-
hood that the temporary energy development will destroy the
agricultural basis of the area.
In all other respects the new water rights would be like prior
appropriation rights and unlike riparian rights: they would be
usable near or far from the source of supply, they could be trans-
ferred with or separate from the land upon which they are used,
and they would be limited in amount diverted and amount con-
sumed.
When all rights share the burden of shortage equally, no one
is above or below a senior right. One right's return flow is as good
as another's, and the classic return flow problem does not arise.
